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Introduction 
 Few events in America generate the same level of devastation and grief as mass shootings. 
There is now a predictable cycle following one of these events: a grieving nation, a paralyzed political 
system, and finger-pointing and assigned blame. For weeks, the nation is greeted by devastating images 
on national news and inflammatory rhetoric. Additionally, America faces a normalized high level of gun 
violence apart from these high-profile shootings compared to similar nations. Smaller scale gun violence, 
including accidents, suicides, and homicides take a consistent but tragic toll on the communities in 
which they take place.  
 Shootings at America’s schools are especially taxing on the nation’s psyche. Tragically, these 
have become increasingly frequent since the shooting at Columbine High School in 1999. The number of 
school shootings has increased, with more occurring post-1990 than between 1760-1990, even as 
violence as a whole decreases at schools (Duplechain and Morris 2014, 145). The toll that these events 
take on affected individuals and communities is made manifest in the proliferation of memorials, vigils, 
and calls for action. What is less clear is how these events embed themselves and persist in the 
community’s memory, potentially creating lingering and pernicious effects for decades and generations 
to come. While the entire nation is witness to the short-term and immediate effects of a school 
shooting, understanding these long-term impacts is essential to solving the policy impasse.  
 My research will analyze how school shootings impact a community’s fertility and birthrate. 
Research has been done into the psychological effects on a community after a shooting, suggesting that 
those who experienced the event first- and secondhand may have lingering effects (this will be 
discussed in detail in the literature review). To understand the full effects, however, we must look 
beyond the immediate generation to the next. A community that is forced to bury its children and 
experience the aftereffects of that event will likely change decisions made about family and children. 
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Understanding these results is critical to fully addressing the needs of a community that has experienced 
violence. 
 I chose to address birthrates and fertility specifically to find out whether school shootings and 
the resulting news coverage impacts how families make fertility decisions – and thus, whether these 
events impact the perceived (or subconscious) costs and benefits of having children. Whether or not 
these effects are stronger or weaker in communities that are less normalized to violence is of interest as 
well. For instance, the high-profile shooting in Sandy Hook, CT could have a more measurable impact 
precisely because it is unusual in that area. It is likely that well-off, rural, and/or white counties will be 
more impacted by school shootings. Much of this comes down to how violence in these communities is 
covered in these communities, which will be discussed in more detail. Interacting with demographic and 
economic information will allow me to paint a more complete picture of these questions.  
 Though research has been done into the psychological impacts of a school shooting, there is 
nothing that has been done directly on fertility and school shootings. Research on family and localized 
economics and school shootings in general seems to be sparse, so I hope that this research can branch 
into a new way of analyzing these tragedies. The closest related work to this paper is Berrebi and 
Ostwald’s study on terrorism and fertility – another instance of discrete, random violent acts impacting 
fertility decisions. This paper largely serves as a model for my research.  
 To address this question, I will build a theoretical model based on the work of Gary Becker. I will 
demonstrate how school shootings could impact the costs and incentives of raising children, and how 
that could subsequently impact fertility decisions. I will then address the question using quantitative 
data from government departments and new outlets to look for significant effects on fertility within a 
county based on the occurrence and scale of a school shooting. I will use appropriate statistical methods 
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in my model in order to account for potential biases and unobserved factors across time and within 
individual counties in America.   
  The theoretical aspect of this approach will allow me to tie together Becker’s framework of 
fertility with the existing psychological and sociological research that has been done on the topic of 
school shootings. For example, lingering PTSD across the community could impact the costs and ability 
of parents to invest in having children. Quantitatively, I can test the theory and see the size and 
significance of the effects.  
In the next section, I review the relevant literature. This is followed by a section describing the 
theoretical model used and the approach of my research. Next, I discuss the data used for my research, 
followed by a section describing my empirical methods. Then I share my empirical results.  Finally, I 
discuss the implications of my results and the possibility for future research in this area.  
Literature Review 
The starting point of my research will be the fertility model proposed by Gary Becker. Becker 
suggests that the demand for children by a family or individual is a function of the expected utility of 
having children and the costs associated with raising them (Becker 2009, 138). Becker goes a step 
further to describe demand for children as being a trade-off as parents balance quantity of children with 
investing more into the quality of each child (145). This will provide the theoretical framework for my 
hypothesis. Much of the following research, whether economics, psychology, sociology, or otherwise, 
can be tied into one of Becker’s variables and predicted to shift the fertility rates of the community. 
Becker’s research is discussed in more detail later. 
There has been a small amount of research done on the effects of school shootings on family 
and local economics. Students’ performance in school following a shooting can be negatively impacted 
(Beland and Kim 2016, 123). Most relevantly, Abouk and Adams find that private school enrollment 
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increases between 10-12% in areas affected by a school shooting, especially rural and suburban 
communities (2013, 297). This finding suggests that parents may place higher value on the quality of 
children in the wake of a school shooting. Supporting this conclusion, and feeding into my hypothesis, 
are findings that school shootings often create a public fear and panic, even while the statistical 
likelihood of violence occurring is declining (Burns and Crawford 1999, 147). Following Columbine, a 
majority of Americans believed that similar violence could occur in their own communities (Saad 1999). 
This type of uncertainty has long been an effect, and goal, of terror attacks. 
Importantly, as Abouk and Adams’ research hints at, it is likely that these effects are not equal 
across all communities. Although school shootings occur more frequently in urban schools than rural, 
newspapers spent more time covering the rural shootings (Menifield et al. 2001). The authors also found 
evidence of priming based on the race and gender of both perpetrators and victims. White men were 
oftengiven an excuse of outside social factors (such as bullying or economic opportunity), while men of 
color were more typically held personally responsible (Menifield et al. 2001, 461). This suggests not only 
that all shootings are not covered equally, but that rural, white, or wealthy communities may be more 
prone to a narrative of a sympathetic tragedy.  
A limitation on the school shooting research is that much of it comes in the aftermath of the 
Columbine shooting around the turn of the millennium. The most common types of research around this 
time seem to be media analyses and psychological studies of the communities and perpetrators. With 
the creation of the Washington Post’s database in 2018 and others like it in recent years, more 
quantitative studies such as this one are becoming possible. However, it also means that much of the 
existing literature on school shootings does not take more recent instances into account.   
 To get around the lack of research on school shootings and to further make my theoretical case, 
I will be drawing on literature on terrorist attacks. Though there are important differences between the 
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two, terrorism and school shootings are both unexpected, seemingly random occurrences of violence 
that leave lasting effects on a community. Often, neither occur within the context of a larger conflict, 
such as a civil war. Both tend to target places that are seen as symbolic or innocent – schools, hospitals, 
places of worship, etc – and typically victims are “everyday people,” rather than officials or celebrities.  
 Most relevantly, existing research finds a link between terrorism and declining fertility rates, 
both total fertility rate and crude birth rate (Berrebi and Ostwald 2014, 1). Fertility is affected in two 
major ways: the nationwide birthrate the year after an attack, as well as the total number of births that 
women in the country are expected to have in a lifetime (2014, 1). This suggests that these attacks leave 
lasting effects, both on individuals and the community at large. As well as lasting the lifetimes of those 
affected, it also suggests that a dip in birthrate follows in the years after an attack.  
 Berrebi and Ostwald’s findings and methods are a proof-of-concept for my own research. Their 
findings are at the country level, which gives them a larger number of variables than are available at the 
county level in America. They use longitudinal data at the country level and they include 170 countries 
and terrorism data between 1970 and 2007 (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2014). They account for country-
specific laws and institutions that may impact the tendency towards terrorism, as well as GDP per capita 
and geographic measures. Because I will be using county level data, I will have many more observations 
per year and my data will be more specific geographically. My data also has a shorter timeframe 
available. They are also able to draw on a larger body of research into the quantitative factors that 
predispose an area to terrorism, which does not exist for terrorism. Similar research does not exist in 
the same numbers in regards to school shootings.  
 Because Berrebi and Ostwald are researching a similar question, their methodology provides a 
starting point for my own research. They use fixed effects, first differences, and instrumental variables 
(these methods will be defined later). These approaches are taken because they consider terrorism to 
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be an endogenous explanatory variable and attacks are likely to correlate with country level and time 
invariant unobservable factors. For the instrumental variables, they use lagged variables of terrorism in 
neighboring areas (Berrebi and Ostwald, 8). As mentioned, there has been less research on the causes of 
school shootings, so finding an instrumental variable is less straightforward. Below are the models that 
they use to account for these correlations: 
 
 
As well as their explanation of the variable categories, which has inspired my own model: 
 
  
 
Literature exists describing the damage that terrorism does to the psychology of a community as 
well. A year after the attacks on September 11, New Yorkers remained concerned about the potential 
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for future attacks, and this anxiety increased when surrounded with further emergency preparations 
(Boscarino et al. 2003). The NYC metropolitan area had a higher prevalence of PTSD following the 
attacks as well (Schlenger et al. 2002). Eckstein and Tsiddon find that terrorism can affect the larger 
economic output of a region as well, predicting that Israel’s economy suffered by roughly 5% over the 
course of three years as a result of terror attacks across the nation (2004). While this is a 
macroeconomics study, it shows that unexpected violence impact people’s future beliefs and actions 
(impacting investment and government spending), leading to long-run consequences. If long-run 
decisions around investment change, it is possible that long-run decisions about children could change 
as well.  
Following Columbine, there was an increase in the literature surrounding the psyche and mood 
of those who experience school shootings. The effects turn out to be similar in some ways to 
communities that have faced terrorist attacks. PTSD has been found at the community level, evidence of 
the presence of widespread trauma and impacting providers’ the ability to treat at a wider scale 
(Palinkas et al, 2012). Reporters have also been found with trauma after covering these events (Simpson 
and Coté 2006, 193). Other studies note the negative effect on public health and its spread to all aspects 
of the community as a whole (Weintraub et al. 2001). It is likely that the resulting effects from school 
shootings could have similar impacts as they do after acts of terrorism.  
In my research, I hope to provide the missing link between the effects of school shootings and 
their impact on a community’s fertility that Berrebi and Ostwald uncovered for terrorism. Scholars have 
noted the relative lack of research that has been done into the long-term effects of a school shooting 
(Muschert 2007, 75).  Given that random acts of violence such as terrorism and school shootings create 
fear, anxiety, and lasting psychological effects, in addition to tragic losses, it would make sense that 
school shootings would impact fertility in a similar way. Because school shootings specifically harm 
children, this connection is more direct. 
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Approach and Theory 
My theory will primarily be based off of the work of Becker, as discussed above, as well as the 
work of Dr. Turchi (1975). Both lay out a model of fertility as an economic decision, based largely on 
parental income and opportunity cost and the expected utility of a child (Becker 2009). Turchi extends 
Becker’s approach to also account for sociological factors, such as how norms dictate the cost spent on a 
child (Turchi, 1975).  
Becker proposes that children’s costs depend on goods and services, the time of parents, and 
real income, offset by any economic contributions made by the child (Becker 2009, 138). However, 
Becker complicates this by adding in the dynamics of quantity and quality to explain why fertility rates 
have decreased as real incomes have increased in the last century, even though children are presumably 
a normal good. The answer is that parents trade off their spending on children between quality and 
quantity – investing more in each child or into more children as income increases. Abouk and Adams’ 
research of the shift towards private schooling after a shooting could reflect this phenomenon (2013). 
A school shooting, as a shock to an otherwise stable community, could impact these input 
variables. This logic is also used when modeling the effects of terrorism on fertility (Berrebi and Ostwald 
2014, 2). Because a school shooting, like a terrorist attack, is a discrete event, there should be a distinct 
difference following the incident. This is opposed to more systemic or continual forms of violence such 
as gang violence, civil war, and high levels of crime.  
A school shooting is unlikely to affect any of the monetary costs of children in the long-run. 
Goods and services are unlikely to get more expensive, the time of parents likely will not lose value, and 
real income may not be affected. As a result, a single event will not likely make an impact into the long-
run equilibrium on fertility. This theory is contradicted by Berrebi and Ostwald finding that terrorist 
attacks do impact the total number of births in a woman’s lifetime. However, terrorism also tends to be 
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systemic because attacks typically come from organizations, rather than isolated individuals, as is more 
typical of school shootings. This could explain the effects lasting throughout the childbearing period.  
I propose that school shootings might impact fertility in two mechanisms. First, I believe that the 
expected utility of a child could diminish in the wake of a school shooting. Becker discusses how rural 
fertility declined as education became less accessible and children were less useful working on farms 
(Becker 2009, 139). Similarly, if schools are seen as unsafe and possibly a fatal environment for children, 
potential parents may be reluctant to have more children. This thinking could also stem from PTSD and 
other effects becoming more prevalent across the community. 
Secondly, school shootings could cause parents to shift investing more into quality rather than 
quantity. In the immediate aftermath, parents will want to know that their children are safe as they go 
into schools. One example of this, as mentioned, is that private school enrollments increase by about 10 
percent following a school shooting (Abouk and Adams, 2013). The literature thus shows an example of 
communities increasing quality, which should presumably follow with communities decreasing quantity, 
if all else remains the same. As NYC experienced more anxiety with increased emergency preparations, 
this could also cause increased fear and anxiety if communities extensively compensate following a 
school shooting (Schlenger et al. 2002). 
However, much of the potential effects of school shootings is likely less able to be quantified 
and modeled. Much of the research into community psychology in the aftermath of a shooting paints a 
grim picture. Whether the community is afflicted with panic, PTSD, or questions of meaning, many of 
these sinister and subliminal conditions could make having a child less desirable. Berrebi and Ostwald go 
to great lengths to show the connection between these subtle stresses and their impact on biological 
fertility, whether psychological or physiological (2014, 2). Many of these studies apply directly to 
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warzones specifically, but the overall effect mirror many of those cited above, suggesting that collective 
trauma after violence could impact fertility.  
Data  
1. School Shootings Data 
The Washington Post has developed a database of over 200 school shootings that have occurred 
since the shooting at Columbine High School in 1999 (Cox, et al., 2018). There is no database of school 
shootings kept by the federal government, so a database such as this is the most reliable option. The 
Washington Post database includes multiple layers of locational data, which plug into coding used by 
government agencies. This database has 221 school shootings since Columbine – all of which happen at 
elementary, middle, and high schools. 
The Washington Post model also includes further data on shootings and schools that may be 
used for increased specificity beyond geography and casualties. Casualties are broken into injuries and 
fatalities, which allows me to account for the scale of the shooting. School size is also included, which 
could enable me to account for the percentage of the county’s students and families that were present 
– although many school districts cross county lines. Further school information included is the range of 
ages taught at the school, whether the school is public or private, and the racial breakdown of the 
student population. 
2. Demographic and County Data 
 For population data, I will use the American Community Survey (ACS) One Year Estimates. These 
estimates range from 2007 to 2017 and include communities that have at least 60,000 residents. There 
are also five year estimates available, which include all communities, but come at the cost of only giving 
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two observation periods. In order to track birthrates over time, I will be using the one year version. 
These variables will provide both a birthrate as well as my control variables.  
 The downside of using the One Year Estimates is losing communities that have fewer than 
60,000 residents. However, this will only account for losing around 15 shootings nationwide through 
eleven years. Although the five year estimates have more accurate data, they do not allow me to track 
year-over-year changes. Although there are supplemental estimates that include communities with 
20,000 – 60,000 residents, these estimates do not include fertility data. 
 A complete list of important variables is below, but generally, the ACS allows me access to basic 
demographic, economic, and educational variables. Typically, these yearly estimates include roughly 800 
counties per year, depending on data availability. I rescaled the population variable into thousands of 
people. Similarly, the median family income variable was recoded into quintiles in order to allow for a 
nonlinear relationship.  
3. Fertility Data 
 The fertility data I use for my research comes from two sources. First, the ACS yearly estimates 
include a measure of the county’s yearly birthrate – defined in the data as number of women who gave 
birth per 1,000 women aged 15-50 in the past 12 months. This variable is available on the county level 
by year.  
 My second source is birth data from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), part of the 
CDC. This data provides a birthrate by county and year. The birthrate measures the total number of 
births in a year divided by total population. This data is available for fewer counties per year than the 
ACS, typically around 600 counties per year. The NCHS also has a fertility rate available, which measures 
the number of births in a year divided by women aged 15-44, however this statistic was not available for 
enough counties to run meaningful tests on it.  
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 The NCHS will be my primary birthrate variable for a couple of reasons. First, it actually 
measures the actual number of births, rather than the number of women giving birth. Second, the NCHS 
sources their data from birth and hospital records, rather than survey responses. Although this limits the 
number of counties for which the data is available, this method will be more accurate. The ACS data will 
still be used, although its sole advantage is having more counties available per year.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable name (county, 
year) 
N Mean S.D.  Min Max 
Women 15-50 with births in 
past year per 1000 (ACS) 
8393 54.85 15.28 12 157 
Number of births divided by 
total population (NCHS) 
5980 12.61 2.45 5.81 26.33 
      
Total Population 8390 341,456.30 588046.3 62467 10170292 
Median Family Income 8860 70796.61 17334.69 34451 156020.7 
Unemployment Rate 8805 6.7 2.52 1.3 21.7       
% with Bachelor's degrees or 
higher 
8900 27.5 10.14 7.3 75.9 
% white  8390 79 14.72 13.8 98.2 
% black 8390 10.92 12.31 7.53 33.96 
% enrolled in K-12 8390 17.1 2.37 5.04 25.67 
% of enrolled students in 
public school 
8390 89.83 4.78 5.04 25.67 
% women aged 15-50 8243 24.15 2.33 7.53 33.96       
Shooting Dummy (lagged 1 
and 2 years) 
8900 
  
0 1 
Deaths (lagged 1 and 2 
years) 
8900 
  
0 26 
 
Methodology 
In order to measure the potential effects of school shootings on birthrates, I will use random 
and fixed effects models. A simple OLS model would not account for potential omitted variable bias or 
unobserved heterogeneity. The largest concern is unobserved time-invariant county-specific effects that 
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could bias a simple OLS model. Random effects controls for this heterogeneity, but only if it is not 
correlated with any of the observed independent variables. Fixed effects include the means of each 
variable in order to also account for correlation between the time invariant heterogeneity and the 
observed variables. Fixed effects will neutralize this concern if the null hypothesis of exogeneity is 
rejected in the Hausman test. Otherwise, random effects is the most efficient estimator.  
A robust Hausman test will reveal which of the two is the better estimator.  The Hausman test 
tests the null hypothesis of exogeneity. If the null hypothesis is rejected, meaning that there is 
correlation between the observed variables and county-level time invariant unobservables, then fixed 
effects is the only consistent estimator between the two. Random effects only remains consistent if the 
null hypothesis is not rejected, meaning that as the sample size increases, estimates converge on the 
actual values When the null is not rejected, random effects is the more efficient estimator between the 
two, so that is the favored estimator in that case.  
Model: 
𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽1 ∙ (𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−𝑗) +  𝛽2 ∙ (𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3 ∙ (𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽4
∙ (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5  ∙ (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) +  𝛽6 ∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖) +  𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
Variables: 
 Fertilityi, t+1: birth rate or fertility rate by county i in year t+1, allowing for lagged effects from 
other variables. 
 Shootingi, t-j: dummy of the occurrence of a school shooting in the county i and year t – j, where j 
ranges from 0 to 1 (whether a shooting occurred in the previous two years) 
 Demographicsi,t: Population size in 1,000s, % of population that is white, % of population women 
aged 15-50 in year t and county i  
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 Economicsi,t: unemployment rate, quintile of family income in county i and year t 
 Educationi,t: % of population enrolled K-12, % of K-12 students in public and private schooling, % 
of population with bachelor’s degree or higher in county i and year t 
 Yeart, countyi : Year and county fixed effects  
In addition to that basic model, I will also run a model including interaction terms. These terms 
will see if certain factors make a county’s fertility more likely to respond to a school shooting. 
Specifically, I will be testing whether or not income quintiles, race, and proportion of K-12 students lead 
to a different impact on fertility when interacted with a shooting. The rationale behind these variables 
are to represent communities where violence is less normalized, or communities where children make 
up a larger percentage of the population, could make the danger seem more relevant. The difference in 
media coverage is likely to play a role as well. For this interaction model, I will also be using random and 
fixed effect models.  
𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽1 ∙ (𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−𝑗) + 𝛽2 ∙ (𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽3 ∙ (𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽4
∙ (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛽5  ∙ (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) + 𝛽6 ∙ (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖) +  𝛼1 ∙ (𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 ∙ 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
+  𝛼2 ∙ (𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼3 ∙ (𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 ∙ 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
 
As a supplement to both the regular and interaction-based model, I will run models where only 
one variable of interest is featured at a time in order to account for potential collinearity. For the regular 
model, I ran regressions with control variables and each of the four violence variables (shooting dummy 
and death count, at one and two year lags). The interaction model will be the same, except that I will 
run it with both the base variable and one interaction term at a time. For the income quintiles, I will 
include them all simultaneously.  
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Using an instrumental variables approach as well as the above models would have been ideal. 
Instrumental variables allows the model to control for variation between observed variables and both 
the time invariant and time variant unobservables, rather than only the time invariant. However, the 
current research does not offer clear hints on proven instrumental variables, or data availability limits 
the ability to run this type of model. This would have controlled for a possible endogenous relationship 
between school shootings and the fertility of a specific county.  
Results 
Table 2: Random and Fixed Effects model - control variables  
Birthrate Source: NCHS and 
ACS 
NCHS ACS 
Random or Fixed effects  RE FE RE FE 
% Bachelor's or higher -0.009 0.008 -0.142 0.083   
(0.040) (0.110) (0.001) (0.401) 
% People of color 0.051 0.013 0.049 0.271   
(0.000) (0.178) (0.045) (0.169) 
% Enrolled K-12 -0.002 -0.113 1.245 -1.469   
(0.876) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% of students in public school -0.007 -0.009 -0.029 -0.126   
(0.032) (0.001) (0.536) (0.032) 
% Women aged 15-50  -0.092 -0.141 -0.447 -0.081   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.767) 
Unemployment Rate -0.035 -0.030 -0.158 -0.002   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.984) 
Total Population (per 1000) -0.00005 -0.004 -0.0005 -0.016   
(0.637) (0.000) (0.310) (0.018) 
Median Family Income – Q1 -0.122 -0.301 5.047 3.433   
(0.102) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) 
Median Family Income – Q2 -0.057 -0.198 4.518 3.468   
(0.378) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) 
Median Family Income – Q3 0.007 -0.087 2.781 2.043   
(0.897) (0.095) (0.001) (0.068) 
Median Family Income – Q4 0.038 -0.024 1.661 1.071   
(0.396) (0.568) (0.017) (0.239) 
Robust Hausman P-value 0.000 
 
0.000       
Number of Counties 579 579 817 817 
Number of Observations  5917 5917 7972 7972 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Table 2 shows the results of the control variables used in the model. Again, the fixed effects 
estimator is the best estimator (and the only consistent estimator) due to the results of the Robust 
Hausman test. Overall, many of the expected variables are significant. It is likely that many of these 
variables are correlated, such as educational attainment and unemployment rate or income, which 
could mitigate the significance of variables. I again primarily focus on the NCHS data. The variables 
reflecting children (enrolled %, % in public school) carry significance, as well as total county population. 
Percentage of women of childbearing age and unemployment rate are significant in the NCHS, but not 
the ACS. 
 In previous versions of my model, I only included the median family income, rather than dividing 
it into quintiles. Since that change, the shift in results overall has been interesting. Typically, whiteness 
variables have become more significant, where the income variable carried most of the significance in 
the past. Specific income quintiles also become more significant as a result also. It appears that income 
loses significance as the counties become richer, although this effect could overlap with other variables, 
both observed and unobserved. Specifically, the unemployment rate is highly significant in the NCHS, 
which could overlap with how rich a county is. Relatedly, the rate of educational achievement is not 
significant in this model, but because education is often intertwined with income, it could play a role as 
well.  
Table 3 shows the results of the initial random and fixed effects models, as well as the results of 
the relevant robust Hausman tests. As noted in the table, the shooting dummies and death counts do 
not have a significant effect on the birthrates relative to either the total population or population of 
women aged 15-50. Due to the aggregated nature of these variables, as well as the typically small scale 
of these shootings, this is not entirely unexpected.  
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Table 3: Random and Fixed Effects model of birthrate on shootings  
Birthrate Source: NCHS and ACS 
 
NCHS ACS 
Model: Random or Fixed effects  
 
RE FE RE FE       
Shooting dummy (1 year lag) 
 
-0.011 0.008 0.535 0.721   
(0.853) (0.885) (0.687) (0.589) 
Shooting dummy (2 year lag) 
 
-0.076 -0.025 -0.334 0.099   
(0.214) (0.656) (0.805) (0.942) 
Death count (1 year lag) 
 
-0.016 -0.016 -0.243 -0.260   
(0.450) (0.414) (0.616) (0.594) 
Death count (2 year lag) 
 
-0.008 -0.009 -0.119 -0.120   
(0.698) (0.619) (0.806) (0.806)       
Robust Hausman P-value 
  
0.000 
 
0.000       
Number of Counties 
 
579 579 817 817 
Number of Observations  
 
5917 5917 7972 7972 
Year effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
 Although the results are largely insignificant, the majority of the coefficients are negative, which 
is the same direction posited by my hypothesis. The NCHS birthrate results show that all four shooting 
variables could have a negative effect, if any. The ACS measurement is only negatively impacted by the 
death variables in this model. That distinction could imply that fatal shootings are those most likely to 
have a depressing effect on birthrates.   
 The robust Hausman test in both measures of the birthrate rejects the null hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the covariance between the time-invariant error term and the 
independent variables is equal to 0, which would make random effects the better estimator. This result 
means that fixed effects is the more efficient estimator and, more importantly, is the only consistent 
estimator between the two. I will primarily be discussing the results from the fixed effects models as a 
result. This result is true of all of my models.  
There are two potential issues with this initial model that may prevent the discovery of possibly 
significant results. First, there is the potential for strong correlation between the four variables related 
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to shootings. In order to address the problem of correlated variables of interest, I ran the same model 
using only one of the four variables at a time, along with the control variables. It is possible that the 
correlation led the model to spread their effect across the four variables, leading them all to appear 
insignificant.  
Table 4: Random and Fixed Effects model of birthrate on individual shooting variables 
Measurement Source: NCHS ACS 
Estimator: Random or Fixed Effects  RE FE RE FE 
Independent Variable of Interest:         
Shooting - 1 year lag -0.014 -0.0015 0.426 0.581   
(0.812) (0.978) (0.743) (0.656)   
0.000 0.000 
Shooting - 2 year lag -0.078 -0.030 -0.414 -0.002   
(0.190) (0.587) (0.754) (0.999)   
0.000 0.000 
Deaths - 1 year lag 
 
-0.015 -0.014 -0.015 -0.196   
(0.466) (0.460) (0.466) (0.680)   
0.000 0.000 
Deaths - 2 year lag 
 
-0.012 -0.010 -0.130 -0.095   
(0.563) (0.599) (0.784) (0.842)   
0.000 0.000 
Number of Counties 597 597 817 817 
Number of Observations  5917 5917 7972 7972 
Year effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The results of this model appear in Table 4. Similarly to the original model, the results come 
back insignificant once again. Again, all of the robust Hausman tests point to the fixed effects estimator 
as being necessary. Once the fixed effects model controls for the county-level fixed effects, almost all 
observations become less significant. This could point to an unobserved correlation between the 
shooting variables and an unobserved factor.  
The second drawback of the initial model is the absence of interaction terms that allow us to 
investigate how different types of communities respond to violence. The interaction terms used in this 
model are the percentage of white residents, percentage of population enrolled in K-12 education, and 
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median family income quintiles interacted with either the shooting dummies or the death counts. These 
variables were selected to account for demographics and economics, as well as reflecting the existing 
research hypothesizing that whiter and more rural communities get more coverage of school shootings. 
Table 5: Fixed Effects model of NCHS birthrate on shooting dummy interaction terms 
Length of lag One Year Two Years  
 
   
Shooting dummy (1 year lag) 0.256 (0.607) -0.200 (0.736) 
Shooting x % White -0.003 (0.339) -0.003 (0.500) 
Shooting x Income – Q1 0.260 (0.125) 0.294 (0.101) 
Shooting x Income – Q2 0.178 (0.324) 0.134 (0.483) 
Shooting x Income – Q3 0.064 (0.739) 0.009 (0.960) 
Shooting x Income – Q4 0.119 (0.468) 0.056 (0.741) 
Shooting x Enrolled  -0.008 (0.745) 0.014 (0.634) 
  
Table 5 highlights the results of the terms interacted with the shooting dummies with models 
for both one and two year lags. Of note are the results of the first quintile of median family income. 
These results suggest that poorer communities could have higher birthrates following a shootings, 
rather than lower, which fits with my hypothesis, especially if these counties get less coverage of 
shooting in their locales. As discussed in the data section, the NCHS is my primary dataset for birthrates. 
For the previous model, as well as the following models, I only use the NCHS data for simplicity and 
reliability. 
Table 6: Fixed Effects model of NCHS birthrate on deaths dummy interaction terms 
Length of Lag One Year Two Years 
Death count (1 year lag) -0.255 (0.812) 0.616 (0.573) 
Deaths x % White -0.006 (0.322) -0.008 (0.167) 
Deaths x Income – Q1 0.147 (0.205) 0.195 (0.130) 
Deaths x Income  - Q2 0.077 (0.539) 0.032 (0.815) 
Deaths x Income – Q3 -0.047 (0.745) -0.110 (0.359) 
Deaths x Income – Q4 0.013 (0.904) -0.046 (0.687) 
Deaths x Enrolled  0.038 (0.369) 0.002 (0.959)  
 
   
Number of Counties 579 579 817 817 
Number of Observations  5917 5917 7972 7972 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 Table 6 shows the results of the model using interaction terms with the death count on both a 
one year and two year lag in separate models. The two year variable in particular shows more potential 
significance than the one year does. Like the shooting model, the lowest income quartile demonstrates 
the result closest to significance, again showing a positive impact on birthrate in the poorest counties. 
The interaction term with whiteness also demonstrates a possible significance, though not crossing any 
major threshold, which could mean that white communities have lower birthrates as a result of fatalities 
in a school shooting.  
Table 7: Fixed Effects model of NCHS birthrate on individual interaction terms 
Length of Lag One Year Two Years 
Base Variable:  Shootings Deaths Shootings Deaths  
Interaction Base Interaction Base Interaction Base Interaction Base 
Base x % White -0.003 0.272 -0.008 0.594 -0.003 0.164 -0.008 0.626  
(0.261) (0.270) (0.134) (0.143) (0.429) (0.514) (0.096) (0.102) 
Base x Income – Q1 0.256 -0.124 0.134 -0.014 0.293 -0.122 0.172 -0.009  
(0.132) (0.320) (0.246) (0.455) (0.103) (0.330) (0.180) (0.638) 
Base x Income - Q2 0.191  0.071  0.162  0.041  
 (0.281)  (0.573)  (0.383)  (0.762)  
Base x Income – Q3 0.048  -0.070  0.019  -0.100  
 (0.801)  (0.629)  (0.909)  (0.400)  
Base x Income – Q4 0.101  -0.016  0.032  -0.086  
 (0.533)  (0.877)  (0.848)  (0.440)  
Base x Enrolled  -0.007 0.123 0.057 -1.048 0.017 -0.326 0.036 -0.691  
(0.782) (0.781) (0.124) (0.119) (0.555) (0.518) (0.249) (0.242)  
        
# Counties 579 
5917 # Observations  
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Similar to my initial model, I also tested only one interaction variable at a time, as well as 
controls and the “base” violence variable. For example, one model included controls, the one year 
lagged shooting dummy, and its interaction with the whiteness variable. For the income model, I 
included all quintiles simultaneously. The results are displayed in Table 7. Each row shows an interaction 
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term with the results of both the base and interaction variables. For this model, like the others, the 
Hausman test demonstrated that fixed effects was necessary, and those are the only included results. 
Like other models, I also chose only to include NCHS data.  
The model did not dramatically increase the significance of any results. However, two important 
results hold from previous models. The lowest quintile of income (Q1) continues to show more possible 
significance than other variables in the shooting interaction terms for both one and two year lags. 
Though the results do not cross typical significance thresholds, these represent a basis for future 
research.  
 The second important result is the interaction of deaths and whiteness, especially at the two 
year lag. Here, the significance of the interaction term meets the 10% threshold for significance. This 
could indicate that whiter communities are more impacted by fatal shootings than more diverse 
communities. These results again line up with my hypothesis and theory. There are few other results of 
note, although the one year lag for death count comes close to becoming significant at the 10% level for 
enrollment and whiteness interactions. Interestingly, the base variable is negative and the interaction is 
positive. This suggests that there may be a possible relationship where communities with a higher 
proportion of K-12 students are less susceptible to negative effects from fatal shootings. The reverse is 
true for whiteness, with the interaction term driving potential lowering of the birthrate. 
Conclusion 
 This research attempted to empirically identify a relationship between school shootings and 
yearly birthrates. Although my research failed to identify a robust relationship between the two, I 
believe there are still ways to delve deeper into this path of study. As demonstrated, more specification 
seemed to lead to more significant results. Perhaps with more specific data, especially geographically, it 
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would be easier to find a significant relationship. With more data, it would be prudent to control for gun 
violence as a whole, which could allow more unusual shootings to stand out in the model. 
 Another possible route of further explanation has to do with media markets and exposure. This 
couples with my hypotheses of communities that are less normalized to violence being more sensitive to 
it. Controlling for where shootings were covered by news outlets, and for how long, could uncover new 
results as well. It is unlikely that counties themselves line up with where a shooting was covered. Lining 
counties up to TV markets or obtaining data on the coverage of these shootings could allow this path of 
research. 
The results from Berrebi and Ostwald beg the question: what is the essential difference between 
terrorism and school shootings in impacting fertility? One difference is typically the scale and visibility of 
attacks. Terrorist attacks, even the nonfatal, are often designed for visibility and signaling. School 
shootings, on the other hand, are often not. While many of the widely covered school shootings can be 
easily considered terrorist attacks, many are not. For example, suicides and homicides are included in 
the umbrella of school shootings, but do not carry the same threatening posture towards the entire 
community that a larger attack might.  
 Many terrorist organizations are organized around ideologies, which gives the group a 
cohesiveness and agenda absent from many school shooters.  This type of unrest could correlate with a 
larger societal unrest or uneasiness that could play into birth and fertility rates as well. School shootings 
tend not to have organizational backing that lend credence to a larger ideological divide.  
 While salient at the time of writing, perhaps my focus on school shootings in particular was too 
specific, and better conclusions could be drawn from measuring mass shootings in general. There were a 
number of reasons I opted against this approach to begin with. For one, the definition of mass shooting 
is far from fixed, and almost every database or article on these occurrences use a slightly different one. 
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School shootings are inherently more specific, for better or for worse. Second, there are many more 
mass shootings, regardless of definition. Some define mass shootings as a shooting with two or three 
deaths, which creates a large potential dataset that would be difficult to amass. The matter of gun 
research has sometimes become politicized as well, making these larger questions harder to ask. With 
further research, and more time, one could track down databases of shootings and winnow them based 
on the chosen definition. Finally, the defining factor came into play here as well. Mass shootings share 
the characteristic of multiple deaths, while school shootings share their location amongst children, 
which I believed could move the needle of the birthrate.  
 The biggest takeaway from my research for further study is that not all shootings cause equal 
reactions. While generic violence variables were uniformly insignificant, the interaction terms came 
much closer to having a robust effect on birthrate. This result leads me to believe that these interaction 
terms should be the focus in future research, to further dive into how varying communities are affected. 
  
26 
 
Works Cited 
Abouk, Rahi, and Scott Adams. "School shootings and private school enrollment." Economics 
Letters 118, no. 2 (2013): 297-299. 
Becker, Gary Stanley, and Gary S. Becker. A Treatise on the Family. Harvard university press, 
2009. 
Becker, Gary S., and Yona Rubinstein. "Fear and the response to terrorism: an economic 
analysis." University of Chicago mimeo 93 (2004). 
Beland, Louis-Philippe, and Dongwoo Kim. "The effect of high school shootings on schools and 
student performance." Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 38, no. 1 (2016): 113-
126. 
Berrebi, Claude, and Jordan Ostwald. "Terrorism and fertility: evidence for a causal influence of 
terrorism on fertility." Oxford Economic Papers 67, no. 1 (2014): 63-82. 
Boscarino, Joseph A., Charles R. Figley, and Richard E. Adams. "Fear of terrorism in New York 
after the September 11 terrorist attacks: implications for emergency mental health and 
preparedness." International journal of emergency mental health 5, no. 4 (2003): 199. 
Burns, Ronald, and Charles Crawford. "School shootings, the media, and public fear: Ingredients 
for a moral panic." Crime, Law and Social Change 32, no. 2 (1999): 147-168.  
Cox, John Woodrow, Steven Rich and Allyson Chiu. “Washington Post School Shootings 
Database”. GitHub repository, https://github.com/washingtonpost/data-school-shootings, 
2018. 
27 
 
Duplechain, Rosalind, and Robert Morris. "School Violence: Reported School Shootings and 
Making Schools Safer." Education 135, no. 2 (2014). 
Eckstein, Zvi, and Daniel Tsiddon. "Macroeconomic consequences of terror: theory and the case 
of Israel." Journal of Monetary Economics 51, no. 5 (2004): 971-1002.s 
Fast, Jonathan D. "After Columbine: How people mourn sudden death." Social Work 48, no. 4 
(2003): 484-491. 
Menifield, Charles E., Winfield H. Rose, John Homa, and Anita Brewer Cunningham. "The 
media's portrayal of urban and rural school violence: a preliminary analysis." Deviant 
Behavior 22, no. 5 (2001): 447-464. 
Muschert, Glenn W. "Research in school shootings." Sociology compass 1, no. 1 (2007): 60-80. 
Palinkas, Lawrence A., Erica Prussing, Vivian M. Reznik, and John A. Landsverk. "The San 
Diego East County school shootings: a qualitative study of community-level post-
traumatic stress." Prehospital and disaster medicine 19, no. 1 (2004): 113-121. 
Saad, Lydia. "Public views Littleton tragedy as sign of deeper problems in country." Retrieved 
April 2 (1999): 2005. 
Schaffer, M.E., Stillman, S.  2010.  xtoverid:  Stata module to calculate tests of overidentifying 
restrictions after xtreg, xtivreg, xtivreg2 and xthtaylor 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456779.html 
Schlenger, William E., Juesta M. Caddell, Lori Ebert, B. Kathleen Jordan, Kathryn M. Rourke, 
David Wilson, Lisa Thalji, J. Michael Dennis, John A. Fairbank, and Richard A. Kulka. 
28 
 
"Psychological reactions to terrorist attacks: findings from the National Study of 
Americans' Reactions to September 11." Jama 288, no. 5 (2002): 581-588. 
Simpson, Roger, and William Coté. Covering violence: a guide to ethical reporting about 
victims & trauma. Columbia University Press, 2006. 
“Stanford Mass Shootings in America, courtesy of the Stanford Geospatial Center and Stanford 
Libraries”. https://github.com/StanfordGeospatialCenter/MSA.  
Turchi, Boone A. The demand for children: The economics of fertility in the United States. 
Ballinger Pub. Co., 1975. 
United States Department of Health and Human Services (US DHHS), Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), Division of 
Vital Statistics, Natality public-use data 2007-2017, on CDC WONDER Online 
Database, October 2018. Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/natality-current.html on Jan 
20, 2019 1:37:38 PM". 
U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey; using American FactFinder; 
<http://factfinder.census.gov>; (2018). 
Weintraub, Phillippe, Harriet L. Hall, and Robert S. Pynoos. "Columbine High School shootings: 
community response." School violence: Assessment, management, prevention. 
Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association(2001). 
 
 
 
